- I am a postdoctoral fellow in the Institute for Politics and Strategy at Carnegie Mellon University. I hold a BA in J... moreI am a postdoctoral fellow in the Institute for Politics and Strategy at Carnegie Mellon University. I hold a BA in Journalism and Mass Communication from the Universidad Católica de Chile (2002), an MA in Political Science from the Universidad de Chile (2007), and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Pittsburgh (2015). Before entering the Ph.D., I worked at the international desks of the newspapers El Mercurio (Chile, 2002-2008) and ABC (Spain, 2008).
My central line of inquiry explores how the individual differences among presidents of the Americas have an impact on governance. Does it matter who the president is? If so, how does it matter? These are the main questions that motivate my research.
My second line of research is the comparative study of institutions, with a focus on Latin America. I study informal institutions, gender and politics, judicial politics, executive-legislative relations and elections.
My research has been published in the Journal of Law and Courts, The Journal of Legislative Studies, Latin American Politics and Society, Latin American Perspectives, The Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, Bolivian Studies Journal, Revista de Ciencia Política and Política. For more information, please refer to my webpage, www.ignacioarana.com.edit
Research Interests:
Students of judicial behavior debate whether justices time their retirement to allow for the nomination of like-minded judges. We formalize the assumptions of strategic retirement theory and derive precise hypotheses about the conditions... more
Students of judicial behavior debate whether justices time their retirement to allow for the nomination of like-minded judges. We formalize the assumptions of strategic retirement theory and derive precise hypotheses about the conditions that moderate the effect of partisan incentives on judicial retirements. The empirical implications are tested with evidence for Supreme Court members under democracies and dictatorships in six presidential regimes between 1900 and 2004. The theory of strategic retirement finds limited support in the United States and elsewhere. We conclude that researchers should emphasize "sincere" motivations for retirement, progressive political ambitions, and—crucial in weakly institutionalized legal systems—political pressures.
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Political elite members are individuals who influence or make political decisions that have consequences at the national level. De jure elite members control the top positions in the three powers of the state, while de facto members... more
Political elite members are individuals who influence or make political decisions that have consequences at the national level. De jure elite members control the top positions in the three powers of the state, while de facto members exercise influence from the shadows, based on their prominent role in society. Political elites vary across countries in their number, recruitment, circulation, integration, and diversity.
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Este artículo argumenta que la legitimidad del sistema político se encuentra en su punto más bajo desde el retorno a la democracia. El 2016 fue el año en el que un pre-sidente recibió la mayor desaprobación, el que registró el mayor... more
Este artículo argumenta que la legitimidad del sistema político se encuentra en su punto más bajo desde el retorno a la democracia. El 2016 fue el año en el que un pre-sidente recibió la mayor desaprobación, el que registró el mayor ausentismo electoral , el que padeció la mayor desconfianza en los tres poderes del Estado, y el que re-gistró la menor identificación con partidos políticos. La baja legitimidad política del sistema puede relacionarse a causas coyunturales —mala gestión gubernamental y escándalos de corrupción— y subyacentes —desconfianza interpersonal, desapego de la actividad política y élites cerradas— que explican la baja legitimidad. De con-tinuar esta tendencia, esta etapa de baja legitimidad puede transformar el sistema de partidos, favorecer el surgimiento de movimientos y liderazgos populistas, y erosionar la calidad de la democracia chilena.
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The current Bolivian President, Evo Morales, has managed to govern longer than all of his predecessors thanks to his three successful attempts to relax his term limits. In this article, I argue that the high risk-taking personality of... more
The current Bolivian President, Evo Morales, has managed to govern longer than all of his predecessors thanks to his three successful attempts to relax his term limits. In this article, I argue that the high risk-taking personality of Morales, especially his social risk-taking, helps to explain why he has consistently tried to extend his time in the presidency. To address this proposition I follow a twofold strategy. First, I show the results of a survey conducted among experts in presidents of the Americas. This survey measured different personality traits of the leaders that governed between 1945 and 2012, including their risk-taking. Second, I examine some of the most important decisions that Morales has made throughout his adult life. Both the survey and the analysis of Morales' trajectory suggest that his attempts to cling to power are rooted in a risk-taking dynamics.
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Este artículo repasa críticamente el estudio sobre la élite política, incluyendo la evolución histórica de su significado, rol, composición, independencia y las opciones para analizar a sus miembros. Argumenta que para avanzar en el... more
Este artículo repasa críticamente el estudio sobre la élite política, incluyendo la evolución histórica de su significado, rol, composición, independencia y las opciones para analizar a sus miembros. Argumenta que para avanzar en el estudio de los integrantes de la élite es necesario examinar sus diferencias individuales. A modo de ejercicio, se abordan algunas diferencias individuales de quienes están en la cúspide de la élite política en sistemas presidenciales: los presidentes. El análisis muestra que, tomados como grupo, los presidentes del continente tienen un origen socioeconómico medianamente acomodado, al menos un tercio ha sido abogado o participado en fuerzas de seguridad, y que tienden a puntuar bajo en amabilidad y neuroticismo, moderadamente alto en extraversión y apertura a la experiencia, y alto en responsabilidad. Este ejercicio sugiere una agenda de investigación que puede extenderse a otros integrantes de la élite.
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The criticism of the reconstruction that followed the cataclysm in Chile in 2010 has centered on contingent factors including the performance of politicians. An examination of the way structural factors conditioned the governmental... more
The criticism of the reconstruction that followed the cataclysm in Chile in 2010 has centered on contingent factors including the performance of politicians. An examination of the way structural factors conditioned the governmental response to the 8.8 earthquake shows that the constitution created by the military regime shaped the reconstruction through provisions that limited vertical and horizontal accountability in intrastate and state-society relations. The subsidiary state, executive-legislative power relations, the binomial electoral system, and the appointment rather than election of regional authorities favored a recovery effort that has been underinstitutionalized, privatized, characterized by scant participation of victims, and marred by irregularities. An analysis of governmental reports, media outlets, polls, and semistructured interviews conducted with legislators, social leaders, and scholars sheds light on the relation between the constitution and the recovery.
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Recent research suggests that the Chilean Congress is marginalised in the policymaking process, especially when setting the budget. This paper argues that previous studies have overlooked the fact that the legislature uses two amendment... more
Recent research suggests that the Chilean Congress is marginalised in the policymaking process, especially when setting the budget. This paper argues that previous studies have overlooked the fact that the legislature uses two amendment tools – specifications and marginal notes – to increase the national budget and reallocate resources within ministries. This behaviour contradicts the constitution, which only allows Congress to reduce the executive's budget bill. To test this empirically, a pooled two-stage time-series cross-sectional analysis is conducted on ministries for the years 1991–2010. The findings clarify how the legislature surpasses its constitutional limits and demonstrate that specifications are useful to predict when Congress increases or decreases a ministry's budget.
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Studies of executive-legislative relations are usually based only on the analysis of formal institutions, although informal institutions also shape interbranch behavior. This omission leads to questionable results when scholars examine... more
Studies of executive-legislative relations are usually based only on the analysis of formal institutions, although informal institutions also shape interbranch behavior. This omission leads to questionable results when scholars examine the capacity of state institutions to audit other public agencies and branches of government. This article explores how the protocols, an informal institution that shapes the Chilean budgetary negotiations, have increasingly allowed the congress to have a more relevant budgetary role than what the constitution permits. It argues that protocols accommodate some of the undesired consequences of a charter that is strongly biased toward the central government, and describes how this institution has departed from its stringent budgetary focus to encompass broader executive-legislative agreements that enhance the legislature's capacity to oversee the executive.
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Este artículo analiza quiénes y cómo influyen en la toma de decisiones presidenciales al interior del Poder Ejecutivo. En base a entrevistas realizadas a 21 ex presidentes, se argumenta que la tensión entre asesores presidenciales y... more
Este artículo analiza quiénes y cómo influyen en la toma de decisiones presidenciales al interior del Poder Ejecutivo. En base a entrevistas realizadas a 21 ex presidentes, se argumenta que la tensión entre asesores presidenciales y ministros varía según el tipo de liderazgo presidencial y si los ministros son seleccionados libremente por el mandatario o son impuestos por partidos políticos. La interacción de estas dos variables condiciona las relaciones entre ministros y asesores, la cual puede llevar a que los asesores complementen, sustituyan, acomoden o compitan con las tareas de los ministros. Para sistematizar este argumento, se propone una categorización del grado de conflicto que existe entre ministros y asesores.