Carnegie Mellon University
Center for the Neural Basis of Cognition
Previous work has revealed a remarkably direct neural correlate of decisions in the lateral intraparietal area (LIP). Specifically, firing rate has been observed to ramp up or down in a manner resembling the accumulation of evidence for a... more
Each down stroke of an insect's wings accelerates axial airflow over the antennae. Modeling studies suggest that this can greatly enhance penetration of air and air-born odorants through the antennal sensilla thereby periodically... more
Previous work has suggested that the peptide corticotropin-releasing factor (CRF) acts to inhibit visually guided feeding in anurans, but little is known about potential targets for CRF within the subcortical visuomotor circuitry. Here we... more
Each down stroke of an insect's wings accelerates axial airflow over the antennae. Modeling studies suggest that this can greatly enhance penetration of air and air-born odorants through the antennal sensilla thereby periodically... more
Modern manufacturing was revolutionized by the use of interchangeable parts so similar in their function that any one could effectively replace any other. Making such parts meant that manufacturers did not need to keep track of which nut... more
N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptor hypofunction has been implicated in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia. The illness is also characterized by gamma oscillatory disturbances, which can be evaluated with precise frequency specificity... more
Argues that perception as guiding action is a necessary part of action.
Argues that vision for action has conceptual content on the basis of conceptual structuring of attention in action guidance.
Argues against self-monitoring models of auditory hallucination in schizophrenia. Suggests that such hallucinations arise due to overactivation of auditory/language areas.
Presents definitions of automaticity and control, and uses them to show that automaticity in the domain of mental activity does not threaten the possibility of widespread mental action.
Argues that the phenomenology of perceptual attention, phenomenal salience, is not perceptual but cognitive.
Argues that the dorsal stream contributes to conscious visual experience of spatial constancy. Provides an explanation of constancy.
Argues that some mundane forms of visually guided action are guided by unconscious vision.
Presses for a notion of unconscious attention as a counterexample to Prinz's AIR theory. Speculates that Prinz would be better served by dropping the focus on attention in favor of modulations tied to working memory.
We argue that many of the failures of introspection Schwitzgebel discusses are due to inattention in introspection.